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Capitalism’s Cynical Leviathan: 
Cynicism, Totalitarianism, and Hobbes 
in Modern Capitalist Regulation
Peter Bloom - University of Essex, UK.
“Obstinately, he clings to something he has come to see through; but he calls it 
faithfulness” - Friedrich Nietzsche
“Lacan’s theory is perhaps the most radical contemporary version of the 
Enlightenment.” - Slavoj Žižek
How capitalist organizations ensure the obedience of its members has long been a 
matter of discussion.  Behind the idealism of “market freedom” lie more troubling 
realities of daily subordination and ideologies of conformity.  Increasingly scholars 
have studied the effect of subjugating subjectivities present in capitalist production. 
Two specific features of modern capitalism have been the utilization of totalitarian 
discourses, in this case defined within the boundaries of capitalist institutions, and 
the prevalence of cynicism for this purpose.  The former highlights the attempts by 
these institutions to control every aspect of the workers’ experience and 
understandings for the benefit of the company.  Ideologically this involves the 
internalization of capitalist values resulting in practices of “self-regulation” (Knights 
and Wilmont 1989).  By contrast recent research has focused on how employee 
cynicism, away from organizational values, paradoxically strengthens an individual’s 
commitment to these economic institutions (Fleming and Spicer 2003).  A subjectivity 
of “I disagree but I still obey” is central to this seemingly contradictory phenomenon. 
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Currently, analysis of totalitarianism and cynicism exist if not antagonistically at the 
very least in an uneasy tension.  However, a more in depth theoretical and historical 
examination reveals the complementary character of these perspectives within liberal 
theories of sovereignty.  In particular Hobbesian discussions on this topic reflect an 
early and perhaps defining precedent for modern capitalist regulatory ideologies that 
rely on a so-called cynical totalitarianism.
In the contemporary context, Slavoj Žižek has theoretically borne witness to 
the role of both totalitarianism and cynicism for ideological interpellation more 
generally.  The idea of complete subjective inscription speaks to notions of fantasy 
and the Law.  By contrast the perspective of “I disagree but I still obey” resonates 
with the author’s lengthy analysis of cynicism for ensuring the subject’s ideological 
obedience.  Yet while Žižek takes great strides to situate these concepts within a 
workable theory of how certain dominant discourses affectively “grip” the subject, it 
remains ambiguous as to how these categories map out specifically onto each other. 
At stake therefore is to theoretically elucidate how a psychological mode of cynicism 
may work to legitimize and ultimately reproduce forms of totalitarian control.  In order 
to do so it is imperative to return, as Žižek himself so often desires, to the 
Enlightenment.  However, whereas Žižek finds his original interlocutor to be Kant, 
couched in his mandates to “reason about whatever you want and as much as you 
want-but Obey!”, the first and perhaps most forceful thinker to combine cynicism and 
totalitarianism was Hobbes (Žižek 1989: 80).  A more in depth reading of 
contemporary capitalist regulation reveals this reliance on the cynical subject for the 
reproduction of totalitarianism as initially put forth by Hobbes.  
This work thus interrogates how Hobbes’ combination of totalitarianism and 
cynicism into a workable theory of sovereignty resonates with contemporary 
discourses of capitalist control.  After reviewing the recent literature concerning how 
these subjectivities exist as modern techniques for capitalist management I will seek 
to marry these concepts, drawing on a post-structuralist analysis of hegemony and 
fantasy, through a more thorough examination of Hobbes.  First I will trace out the 
similarities of the Hobbesian and capitalist “social contract” as each asks individuals 
to rationally surrender their natural liberty for the promise of security and survival.  I 
will then show the totalitarian basis of these arrangements as the Leviathan and the 
organization respectively decides what is necessary for this contract with relatively 
little limit to their authority.  Following this initial, and perhaps more obvious, 
investigation I will illuminate how Hobbes’s totalitarianism, akin to present day 
capitalism, implicitly contains within it the positive allowance for individual cynicism 
toward existing sovereign regimes.  Specifically Hobbes separates thoughts from 
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action-arguing that individuals may at all times think as they wish provided that they 
are obedient in their actions.  This point directly refers to the responsibility one has to 
comply with a leader if it means the possibility of religious damnation.  In Hobbes an 
individual has the obligation to conform to the Leviathans’ desires in action but not in 
thoughts-precipitating a subject simultaneously bound to a totalitarian system while 
potentially cynical to its rule. 
Modern economic organizations operate from a similar ideological framework 
whereby workers may internally subjectively oppose organizational prerogatives as 
long as they outwardly conform to company policy.  Moreover, like in Hobbes this 
displaces feelings of personal responsibility to these overarching institutions 
legitimizing individual inscription into these institutions despite personal ethical 
disagreement.  Consequently, both Hobbesian liberalism and present day capitalism 
account for and often rely upon a “fetishist disavowal” from its members in order to 
sustain and reinforce totalitarian relationships of power. 
Totalitarianism, Cynicism, and Capitalism Management
Over the past several decades totalitarianism has become a prominent means for 
explaining capitalist regulation.  Central to this analysis has been how current 
economic institutions employ ideological mechanisms demanding complete 
employee submission in all areas of their working life.  In particular capitalist 
organizations “manufacture consent” through the construction of subjectivities able to 
encompass all aspects of an individual’s working experience to their needs (Burawoy 
1979, Clegg and Dunkerley 1980, Knight and Wilmont 1989).  Specifically business 
theorists have noted the importance of creating over-arching management cultures 
that conflate individual desires with those of the company in order to promote 
efficiency and production (Deal and Kennedy 1982, Peters and Waterman 1982, 
Waterman 1988). Hugh Wilmont has by contrast revealed the negative character of 
these ideological regimes, directly relating such ideologies to the fictional dystopia of 
Orwell’s 1984 (Wilmont 1993).
This all-encompassing regulatory framework has led to processes of value 
internalization by workers within these organizations.  Thus the traditional coercive 
nature of totalitarianism becomes translated into types of intentional and induced 
“self-regulation” by employees in conformity with given institutional prerogatives. 
This involves specifically the creation of worker subjectivities aimed at increasing 
productivity and decreasing desires for resistance (Casey 1995).  Moreover, 
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coinciding with this move has been the atomisation of employees designed to replace 
past identifications of workplace solidarity with an over-arching positive individual 
relationship to the company.  Discourses of an “enterprising self” reflect this shifting 
managerial strategy in which individuals are positively interpellated as capitalist 
subjects, accepting of hierarchical power structures and increased demands for 
productivity (du Gay 1996, Fleming and Spicer 2003).  In this way the totalitarian 
character of modern capitalist organizations is exhibited dually in the greater latitude 
given to these institutions regarding their employees and the renewed desires for 
workers to completely and totally identify with their company.    
Recently scholars have expanded this model in order to emphasize how 
individuals look to their place of employment for psychological and social fulfilment 
more generally.  Here workers desire from capitalist institutions a sense of 
wholeness, as the expanded scope of these organizations opens the space for a 
more expansive vision of what these institutions could potentially offer its members. 
Sosteric’s (1996) case study of the restaurant industry speaks to this phenomenon 
reflecting the positive regulatory aspects of this totalitarian mode of control.  Workers 
in his research turned to the company for emotional wholeness and to provide 
meaning to their largely atomised existence.  Importantly these employees saw 
themselves in individual terms not as a collective-each attaining their personal 
dreams and aspirations through the company.  Thus critical scholarship concerning 
the totalitarian character of modern capitalism has transformed from a purely 
negative conception of total individual inscription, akin to modernist fears of unlimited 
sovereignty, to a more positive account of this interpellation with organizations 
increasingly serving as conduits for individual desires.
Not surprisingly however the totalitarian tendencies of modern capitalism has 
led to increased spaces of resistance and heightened experiences of worker dis-
identification.  The increased reach of contemporary economic organizations has 
also expanded the opportunities for resistance.  Sturdy (1998) writes of the inevitable 
tensions that arise in implementing all encompassing institutional discourses.  In 
demanding total complicity companies are exposed to a wider range of questioning 
previously unseen.  Thus, paradoxically, the greater the scope of an institution’s 
ideology the more it avails itself to contradiction and challenge.  In concrete terms 
Knights and McCabe (2000) have chronicled employee resistance against totalitarian 
workplace imperatives through disobedience and subversion.  Examining the 
practices of bank employees the authors investigate how totalistic attempts at 
ideological interpellation produces unachievable demands breeding employee non-
complicity and institutional disillusionment.
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Moreover, this totalitarian model causes greater cynicism among workers. 
The increased resistance of employees reflects a more pervasive ideological 
distancing by these individuals from organizational protocols and values.  Knights 
and McCabes’ work reveals the disenchantment created by unattainable institutional 
demands, fuelling gradually an overall subjective detachment from these over-
arching institutional subjectivities.  Sosternic’s insight into the situating of work sites 
as a place for interpersonal fulfilment exacerbates this problem of cynicism.  The 
inevitable failure of capitalist institutions to psychologically complete individuals, 
despite its claims to the contrary produces employee dissatisfaction and 
disappointment.  The imperative for workers to identify totally with their place of work 
precipitates anger and ultimately dis-identification when these expectations fail to 
materialize.  In particular structural barriers to inclusion in decision-making catalyze 
increased sentiments of cynicism  (Wanous, Richter, and Austin 2000).  The lack of 
genuine democratic participation over company direction and resource redistribution 
augments worker discontent and personal dis-identification within these 
organizations.
Yet such cynicism empirically has not served as a flashpoint for more 
transformatory changes.  Both Knights and McCabe as well as Wanous, Richter, and 
Austin note the ultimately non-revolutionary character of this cynicism.  Fleming and 
Spicer (2003) have accordingly sought to theoretically explain this disjuncture 
between internal dissatisfaction and continued external compliance with 
organizational desires.  Their essay “Working at a Cynical Distance” illuminates the 
relationship between cynicism and capitalist conformity.  Drawing on the work of 
Lacan and Žižek they reveal how cynical attitudes reinforce organizational obedience 
through displacing resistance away from actual practical change and towards a 
complacency of internal disagreement.  Here, cynicism acts as a salve for individuals 
who realize the futility of their working experience yet refuse or are unable to 
actualize this dissent.  Consequently, the very presence of subjective distancing 
works as a barrier to more effective campaigns of resistance.
 How are we then to understand this seeming contradiction between the daily 
presence of individual subjective dis-identification and a continued compliance to 
capitalist organizational prerogatives?  This cynical totalitarianism speaks 
theoretically to two competing elements integral to contemporary capitalist regulation-
namely hegemony and the fetishist disavowal.  Far from being separate both play 
into and enhance the overall strength of the other.  Interrogating the dominant 
theorists of each perspective, Laclau and Žižek respectively, speaks to their ultimate 
compatibility.  Laclau’s notion of hegemony highlights how an organizational ideology 
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can suture itself as an all-encompassing subjectivity due to the fact that discourses 
ontologically seek to dominate totally a given social space.  
However, implicit in the Laclauian account is the eternal availability of 
contestation to this hegemonic discourse as no one subjectivity can completely 
monopolize a subject’s understanding. It is at this juncture between complete 
interpellation and hegemony that cynicism reveals its importance for individual 
inscription, an idea expressed most clearly in the work of Žižek. The inherently 
incomplete nature of this hegemony provides the very terrain for a cynical obedience-
as one can recognize the inadequacies of a hegemonic discourse without thinking 
beyond its ideological horizons.  At stake thus is not internal coherence of a 
hegemonic discourse but the forms of enjoyment it provides to its inscribed subject. 
To this end an individual is able to participate within a hegemonic field of meaning 
without internally accepting its over-arching truth value.  Put differently, a dominant 
social understanding is sustained exactly through the allowance of internal subjective 
disagreement premised on the perceived inability to change prevailing systems of 
power.
Laclau, Hegemony, and the Impossibility of Total Inscription
Laclauian notions of hegemony correspond strongly with contemporary 
configurations of capitalist totalitarianism.  In his work with Chantal Mouffe 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1986) he describes how central to politics and 
subjectification is the contingent battle for dominance between competing suturing 
discourses.  Here the line dividing discursive and non-discursive disappears, as all 
actions and understandings are constituted within prevailing hegemonic fields of 
meaning.  Whether one is playing football, building a house (Laclau and Mouffe 
1990) or completing a sales call, each of these practices is precipitated by and given 
relevance through an existing dominant discourse.  Significantly, this discursive war 
of positions is emptied of any essential character, as a hegemonic constellation is 
never a priori pre-determined.  Politics and the formation of the social more generally 
thus revolve around the struggle between discourses to achieve supremacy. 
Hegemony therefore for Laclau is the effort to cohere and unify the multiplicity of 
available subjectivities and social understandings into a singular discourse 
overdetermining a subjects’ perspective.  In their words it is “a space in which bursts 
forth a whole conception of the social based upon an intelligibility which reduces its 
distinct moments to the interiority of a closed paradigm” (Laclau and Mouffe 1986: 
93).  
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This analysis of hegemony illuminates current efforts by capitalist 
organizations to completely define its employees to their own advantage.  The 
plurality of subject positions within an institution and various desires driving its 
members is overcome through the appearance of over-determining organizational 
discourses.  These proscribed subjectivities situate employees into a similar mindset 
designed to enhance a company’s prerogatives.  Thus regardless of department, 
occupation, or overall place within the organizational hierarchy capitalist institutions 
employ hegemonic discourses to reinforce company values and ensure employee 
conformity.  However, at the heart of this attempted interpellation, whether it be in 
companies or in more obvious political struggles, lies a paradox.  The very attempt to 
completely inscribe individuals ideologically is what opens the space for the 
contestation of these hegemonies.  Laclau and Mouffe refer to this as the 
“impossibility of society” in so much as any attempt to completely define society will 
ultimately be insufficient to describe a social space composed of a multiplicity and 
often times dissimilar subjectivities  (Laclau and Mouffe 1986: 114).  In doing so a 
hegemonic discourse, seeking the total ideological inscription of the subject, reveals 
its ultimate deficiency for this purpose.  This eternal incompleteness thus allows 
differing discourses to emerge challenging such dominant articulations.  To say 
therefore that “this company is this” or “this is Britain,” reveals paradoxically exactly 
what is not being represented in such a definition.  Consequently, in striving for a 
complete and homogenous discursive identity what emerges is the very 
heterogeneity of the object being described.
Borne out of this contradictory, though necessary process of identification, are 
renewed opportunities for counter-hegemonic questioning and resistance.  For 
Laclau and Mouffe a discourse cannot simply exist outside of hegemony.  Instead all 
meanings are formed through, or in resistance to, an existing dominant ideology.  For 
this reason they refer to antagonisms as “the limit of objectivity” in that challenges to 
a hegemonic discourse exposes the non-objective quality of these prevailing 
subjectivities while opening the space for new social truths to become dominant. 
(Laclau and Mouffe: 122).  Primarily theorists have employed this framework in order 
to explain social change.  Specifically, Laclau has described how hegemonies 
become dislocated and are thus made available for replacement.  Here “dislocations 
are events that cannot be symbolized by an existent discursive order, and thus 
function to disrupt that order” (Howarth 2000a: 111).  Using the case of Apartheid 
South Africa, Howarth (2000b) and Norval (1996) have shown how this entrenched 
racialist discourse was made subject to contestation due to events like the Soweto 
crisis in the early 1970’s, paving the way for the hegemonic ascendancy of a multi-
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ethnic liberal democratic discourse to reign supreme by the late 1980s.
However, while this model works well in illustrating the continual instability of 
hegemonies it nonetheless is problematic in portraying how such dominant 
articulations remain viable despite large-scale ideological dis-identification.  One 
does not have to look far in the post-cold war era for evidence of the simultaneous 
presence of disillusionment and conformity.  Mass disenchantment of electoral 
choice in established Western democracies, and progressively smaller voting turnout, 
speaks to the subjective distancing individuals exhibit to reigning ideological 
configurations.  Yet this has not in turn catalyzed broad based movements for social 
transformation or substantive questioning to the ideals of liberal democratic 
nationalism within these contexts.  Similarly, as the empirical work of Wanous, 
Richter, and Austin along with Knights and McCabe show greater workplace cynicism 
is not a recipe for transformatory workplace resistance.  This theoretically validates 
Fleming and Spicer’s insight into the non-revolutionary nature of this cynicism more 
generally.
Žižek, Cynicism, and Totalitarianism
Recent psychoanalytic perspectives help to gain purchase on this paradoxical 
phenomenon of cynicism as a reinforcement of hegemonic ideologies.  Post-
structuralist readings of Jacques Lacan, especially concerning fantasy, reflect the 
ways a dominant discourse may act to interperllate a subject despite its unfulfilling 
qualities. Here an inherently lacking subject’s drive for psychoanalytic wholeness 
becomes manifested into a particular articulated desire (Glynos and Stavrakarkis 
2004: 206-207).  Accordingly, an individual finds solace in pursuing such a fantasy 
even when confronted with the futility of this phantasmatic longing.  For Lacan 
individuals thus gain enjoyment, or jouissance, from over-arching fantasies that are 
inherently unattainable (Evans 1998, Fink 1995, Fink 1997, Miller 2000).  This 
psychoanalytic reading of fantasy importantly is linked to collective social discourses 
of hegemony.  Slavoj Žižek in particular has shown the ways that dominant 
understandings are reinforced and indeed sustained through the personalized 
enjoyment individuals gain from this shared world-view (Žižek 1989).  Here 
jouissance plays a necessary supporting role for hegemonic articulations-as it 
explains how such colonizing discourses remain so appealing to those being 
inscribed within its meanings.  In the words of Žižek:
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What psychoanalysis can do to help the critique of ideology is precisely to 
clarify the status of this paradoxical jouissance as the payment the exploited, 
the served received for serving the master.  This jouissance of course, always 
emerges within a certain phantasmic field; the crucial precondition for breaking 
the chains of servitude is thus to ‘transverse the fantasy’ which structures our 
jouissance in a way which keeps us attached to the Master-makes us 
accept the framework of the social relationship of domination” (Žižek 1997: 48; 
also taken from Glynos and Stavrakakis 2004).      
The increasingly atonimised and individualistic character of post-industrial capitalism 
further highlights the importance of fantasy for present practices of capitalist 
regulation.  Phantasmatic inscription as put forward by Lacan is intrinsically 
individualistic by nature, in contrast to the Law, which acts homogenously to regulate 
individual, or create the collective limits, for individual desire.  In this sense the Law is 
the set of mandates, understandings, taboos that help to circumscribe personalized 
desire-a desire which is simultaneously borne out of the Law yet nonetheless whose 
primary purpose is to transgress its boundaries.  As such the Law is that which 
structures individual social relationships, giving it order and meaning as part of a 
larger collective just as language structures individual unconscious and ones 
understanding of symbolic reality: “This law, then, is revealed clearly enough as 
identical with an order of language.  For without kinship nominations, no power is 
capable of instituting the order of preferences and taboos that bind and weave the 
yarn of lineage through succeeding generations” (Lacan 1977: 66).
Žižek describes this distinction, even while correctly appealing to the inter-
subjective nature of fantasy, in the following way:
To speak of the ‘social fantasy’ seems nevertheless to imply a fundamental 
theoretical error insofar as a fantasy is basically non-universable.  The social 
fantasy is particular, ‘pathological’ in the Kantian sense, personal…the unique 
way each of us tries to come to terms with the Thing, the impossible 
jouissance….The field of Law, of rights and duties, on the contrary, is not only 
universalizable but universal in its very nature. 
In this way within the larger restrictions of the Law a diverse number of fantasies and 
desires can exist.  Think in this instance of a nation-state.  While all citizens must 
uniformly obey its legal mandates nonetheless people seek fulfilment through its 
auspices in a variety of ways.  Thus while nationalism may have a broad based 
appeal each subject uniquely experiences and designs this ideology according to 
their own wishes.  Within modern capitalism employees craft institutional fantasies as 
specific to their distinct desires.  Consequently, companies exist not simply as 
behemoths promoting a homogenous vision of reality but as ambiguous sites able to 
potentially fulfil a heterogonous number of subjectively constructed aspirations.  The 
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Law plays into this as these desires, despite differences, are constantly translated 
through the continued existence of the company and its established regulatory 
demands.  Thinking again of the nation-citizens may have divergent conceptions of 
what it means to be ideally British, a welfare or a Thatcherite free-market for 
instance, yet nonetheless all rely on the survival of the nation for these fantasies to 
become potential realities, thus subscribing to the necessity of national security.  Of 
primary significance here is how these organizations or imagined communities 
conflate their own existence with the inherent need for order more generally.  
This tension between the personalized nature of fantasies and the aggregate 
mandates of the Law opens the way for understanding the phenomena of cynical 
conformity.  Though the futility of fantasy may breed the cynic, it is the continued 
force of the Law that ensures the continued obedience of subjects.  Žižek refers to 
this contradiction as the “fetishist disavowal.”  Here, an individual recognizes the 
absurdity or failures of a particular person or order yet nonetheless remains an active 
participant to its demands.  Put differently, it is the perspective of the compliant cynic, 
one who justifies his or her conformity by internally declaring “I know this is wrong yet 
I still act for what else is there?” (Žižek 1989, Žižek 2004)  It would be too easy to say 
however that this disavowal is merely a new form of jouissance (though that is 
certainly an element) whereby an individual gains enjoyment from their understood 
inability to be fulfilled.  Instead such a mindset is premised on a deep ideological 
commitment to the sanctity and necessity of a given symbolic order.  Žižek 
masterfully employs the very institutions of the law to reveal the over-determining 
significance of the Law for inscribing even disillusioned individuals within a prevailing 
hegemonic field of meaning.  Speaking through the mouth of the doubting defendant 
in the presence of an incompetent judge he declares: "I know very well that things 
are the way I see them /that this person is a corrupt weakling, but I nonetheless treat 
him respectfully, since he wears the insignia of a judge, so that when he speaks, it is 
the Law itself which speaks through him”  (Žižek 2005).  
It is this simultaneous presence of distancing and belief that explains the 
actions of the cynical conformist.  Even at her most disenchanted she remains 
committed to the necessity of the Law, the need for a given system to exist for others 
to fulfil their fantasies.  The instance of legality previously mentioned encapsulates 
this disjuncture.  To dismiss the judge would have been to disregard the very sanctity 
of lawfulness-destroying even the possibility for justice.  Yet what is essential in this 
case is not that the disillusioned subject seeks fulfilment within the law, or any Law 
for that matter.  Instead such an individual cannot think beyond the boundaries of 
these systems.  Indeed it is the fundamental dichotomization of reality between 
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chaos and order-here the dignity of the punitive law comes to represent the 
requirement of a Law in toto.  Thus it is no longer a matter of choosing orders but 
accepting the need for order as such even in disagreement with the current state of 
affairs.
Through this framework of the fetishist disavowal it is made clear how an 
individual could remain committed to a hegemonic discourse even while subjectively 
dis-identifying with it.  Hegemonies deal with their incomplete character through 
phrasing themselves not merely in the particularity of their own ideology but in the 
very requirement of hegemony as such.  Thus even if one rejects the nation, to think 
outside its ideological boundaries would be to reject the necessity of community. 
Similarly, for an employee to dismiss the mandates of a capitalist organization 
wholesale is akin to imagining a world of pure competition without any regulation or 
assurances of economic security.  In this way though one may disagree with a 
system nonetheless they maintain their obedience to its demands exactly because to 
not do so would be to deny the importance of the Law, or any order, more generally 
for structuring human affairs.  Individuals are therefore shaped to be at once above 
the Law yet continually committed to its over-arching importance.  
This paradoxical situating of the subject as simultaneously above the Law yet 
subservient to its demands thus reflects the affective role of cynicism for ideologically 
reproducing hegemonic configurations of power.  To this end, through the 
performance of the fetishist disavowal, an individual is able to gain the enjoyment of 
transgressing the Law without the consequences of confronting the “real”, or always 
incomplete nature, of order as such.  The Law provides the subject therefore a 
means of transcending the confines of the Law while respecting its necessity in 
structuring society through the specified fantasies in which it manifests itself within. 
This speaks to the always transgressive role of fantasy to the Law.  While the Law 
represents the taboos, the very irrational essence of the social, fantasies gain their 
force through their promise of transgressing such entrenched apriori limits.  However, 
via cynicism, the individual is presented the opportunity of going beyond the 
restrictive confines of the Law, as a subjective ideological force, while remaining 
compliant to over-arching ideological prerogatives.  When one says “I know this is 
wrong but I follow” what they are really articulating is the safe pleasure gained 
through the fetishist disavowal, the comfortable distance they retain to an over-
determining set of ideological relations commanding their actions.  
Consequently, this hegemonic strategy acts to disempower individuals from 
demanding or even expecting positive social transformation.  Hegemonies situate 
individual resistance so that they can dis-identify with prevailing values yet see no 
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way in which to reimagine their present circumstances.  By presenting hegemonies 
as the decision between order and anarchy, survival and non-survival, individuals are 
able to equally disregard the content of dominant ideologies while being “free” from 
having to change them.  This “relief” from responsibility enables subjects to 
simultaneously feel validated in their disillusionment of obviously constricting ruling 
systems while still comfortably acting as if they believe.  Fleming and Spicer describe 
this phenomenon in the following way: “…when the dis-identification process is 
enacted it can establish an alluring ‘breathing space’ where people feel 
untrammelled by the subjective demands of the organization, but which ironically 
permits them to behave as an efficient and meticulous member of the team 
nevertheless”  (Fleming and Spicer 2003: 167).  Here hegemonies are strengthened 
exactly because they do not demand belief.  Individuals are exempted from ethically 
identifying with dominant ideologies, or a sense of responsibility toward them based 
on their disagreement with its principles coupled with the accepted necessity of these 
configurations of power.  An employee may after work make fun of their boss; laugh 
at the organizations constantly repeated clichéd ideals, and pull pranks at the office 
yet still be a model employee in so much as these institutions present themselves as 
despite all else the very means of these individuals’ continued existence.  If they quit 
one job their next job would undoubtedly operate from the same underlying set of 
values and practices.  To dramatically question such a system would be to challenge 
the entire structures of society, the very basis for present security, order, and 
survival.  Cynicism on the other hand permits this disillusioned subject the moral high 
ground of internal dissent without the added obligation of revolutionary or reforming 
action.
Importantly, cynicism is the rational consent to the irrationality of an eternally 
incomplete symbolic order.  Law, in the Lacanian sense, is never rational in its own 
right.  Instead it is the irrational, the non-explainable, apriori limits for the allowance of 
order more generally.  Žižek states in this regard “it follows, from this continuously 
senseless character of the Law, that we must obey it not because it is just, good or 
even beneficial, but simply because it is the law” (Žižek 1989: 37).  For this reason 
ideological compliance based on conscious belief is always secondary, and of a 
weaker character, than the external submission to its over-determining mandates.  In 
Žižek’s own words: 
the only real obedience, then, is an ‘external’ one: obedience out of conviction 
is not real obedience because it is already ‘mediated’ through our subjectivity-
that is, we are not really obeying the authority but simply following our own 
judgement, which tells us that the authority deserves to be obeyed in so far as it 
is good, wise, beneficient…” (Žižek 1989: 37).  
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The cynic therefore is expressing, even in the attitude of utter disdain, a more 
thorough and complete acceptance of a totalitarian system of control.  In this respect 
the cynic obeys not out of belief, or a rational acceptance of its mandates, but out of 
duty and fidelity to the need for order as such.  Paradoxically therefore, the 
perspective of the disbelieving fetishist is always pragmatic-founded in the rational 
acceptance of the irrational.  Žižek notes accordingly that “fetishist are not dreamers 
lost in their private worlds, they are thoroughly realists able to accept the things the 
way they actually are…” (Žižek 2001: 14, also found in Johnston 2007: 73).    In this 
respect, it is the very act of laughing at power, even while following its every decree 
that fantasies remain at their most effective for completely suturing the subject within 
its ideology.  Indeed, to Žižek “the ruling ideology is not meant to be taken seriously 
or literally.  Perhaps the greatest danger for totalitarianism is people who take its 
ideology literally…”  (Žižek 1989: 28).  The rationalization of an ideology as a fantasy, 
in terms of its correctness and overall appeal to pre-conceived normative values, 
opens it exactly to the questioning of its legitimacy.  In so much as any phantasmatic 
order will necessarily be incomplete, on the basis of belief it will always be found 
insufficient.  No order can ever be completely just, internally coherent, or fulfilling. 
Instead, the compliance of the cynic is based on a much stronger bond-the 
acceptance of its imperfection yet rational consent to its mandates despite this 
realization.  Indeed it is when such ideological fidelity is premised on the acceptance 
of the universal Law as opposed to the particularity of the fantasy that its 
reproduction is most assured.            
Consequently, it becomes apparent why the cynical totalitarian, one who does 
not even recognize or admit they are in a totalitarian system, is so much more stable 
than those subjects engaged in an explicitly totalitarian project.  In his own work 
Žižek differentiates between the “totalitarianism of fantasy” and the “totalitarian 
fantasy” (Žižek 2006:88).  The former denotes the all-encompassing character of 
fantasises for constituting an individual’s worldview and structuring their actions.  The 
latter by contrast signifies a specific phantasmatic form founded on desires to unite 
individuals homogenously in the pursuit of wholeness.  In this sense, the “totalitarian 
fantasy” acts to completely conflate the Law with fantasy, to deny them a “minimal 
distance” by which fantasies, formed out of the Law, can nevertheless seek its 
transgression (Žižek 2006: 91).  Put differently it is the establishment not of order per 
say but of a particular order.  Žižek therefore defines the “totalitarian fantasy” as the 
state of affairs by which the “Law has lost its formal neutrality” (Žižek 1989: 77). 
Thus a traditional totalitarian politics relies not on the cynic but the hysteric or the 
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psychotic-one who by nature defies interpellation yet nonetheless demands from a 
phantasmatic order a legitimization for their continued inscription.  
By contrast the cynical subject of totalitarianism views the Law not in any 
particularized form but as the very mechanism trough which stability is guaranteed. 
As such she is not concerned with whether or not it is right but in the continuation of 
its existence even in the face of its deficiencies.  The Law is in this context not an 
object for belief but a clear means to an end-one whose compliance is demanded not 
due to its own rationality but in the apriori way it obliges individuals to comply with its 
irrational mandates while permitting for the acknowledgement of its own 
imperfections.  Indeed what is more fearful to the sovereign, the subject who is 
convinced that she is forever righteous and therefore demands that their rule never 
betray them or let them down, or the subject who is outwardly disdainful but obeys 
out of a recognition that however deficient at least order is being preserved?  It is for 
this very reason that totalitarianism is at its strongest when it is at its most silent, 
existing as a “totalitarianism of fantasy”, relying on the unbelieving cynical subject as 
opposed to when it announces itself forthrightly and opens itself to the questioning of 
its convictions.  
Thus it is now becomes possible to understand how through hegemony and 
the fetishist disavowal dominant ideologies are able to affectively “grip” individuals 
even in the face of mass cynicism to its values.  By linking the particularities of one 
hegemonic articulation, in all its imperfections, as representative of the Law overall-
individuals are presented the option of complacency, recognizing the present 
absurdity of existing ruling discourses yet conforming to its demands out of fear of 
dis-order and the perceived inability to positively confront such totalistic systems of 
control.  This mode of discursive regulation however is by no means ahistorical. 
Instead it has its historical roots in the Enlightenment.   
Hobbes and a Cynical Totalitarianism 
Thus far this paper has investigated how ideologies interpellate individuals through 
the dual presence of totalitarianism and cynicism.  On the one hand hegemonic 
discourses attempt to completely subjectivize individuals within their field of meaning. 
This is apparent in how political, social, and economic identities increasingly phrase 
themselves as all encompassing entities able to completely fulfil a subject’s needs 
and desires.  On the other hand these dominant understandings deal with their 
inability to achieve this wholesale subjectification through the positive allowance of 
cynicism.  Specifically, through presenting hegemonies in terms of the false decision 
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between order and dis-order, ideological challenges are situated as the questioning 
of the necessity of the Law more generally.  In this way an individual can comfortably 
dis-identify with a prevailing regime while remaining committed to its overall 
importance and conforming to its demands.  As such the very totalitarian character of 
these discursive techniques of control paradoxically relies on the availability of a 
complacent cynicism to its rule.  
The work of the first liberal thinker Thomas Hobbes speaks to this 
contemporary form of capitalist regulation.  Hobbes proposed a theory of sovereignty 
that similarly combined the need for totalitarianism with the positive allowance for 
individual cynicism.  Significantly, Hobbes separated a subject’s right to freedom of 
thought from their obligation for sovereign conformity in action.  A more in depth 
examination of his theory thus does much to shed light on the current capitalist 
promotion of cynical totalitarianism.
Hobbes, the Need for Totalitarianism and Capitalism Regulation
Hobbes is historically associated with totalitarianism and unlimited sovereignty. 
Writing in the aftermath of the English civil war his theory argues for the need of a 
Leviathan able to ensure the collective peace between naturally antagonistic 
individuals.  Consequently, he subscribes sovereign obligation to the over-arching 
requirement of survival both individually and collectively. This appeal to 
totalitarianism as essential to the construction of social order more generally, indeed 
an individual’s very existence, resonates with ideologies of late capitalism. 
Capitalism similarly frames organizational obedience as premised on the need to 
transcend the fearful prospect of individual competition and as a conduit for 
continued material survival.
Hobbes begins his argument with a detailed ontological analysis of the human 
subject.  He describes individuals as naturally desiring goods as well as power 
(Hobbes 1996: 70-71).  The natural liberty of humans pre-supposes paradoxically an 
intolerable situation of infinite conflict and ultimately unjustified domination.  As each 
individual is free to do and pursue what he or she wishes in a world of limited 
resources, over time this liberty becomes translated into an anarchic submission of 
the weak to the powerful (Hobbes 1996: 90-91).  To prevent this outcome Hobbes 
argues for the creation of a collective covenant between subjects for mutually 
assured peace.  This social contract rationally asks individuals to surrender their 
natural liberty for the higher achievement of survival and stability (Hobbes: 120)  
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However, as individuals are by nature competitive and driven by shortsighted 
“passions” this “social contract” must be maintained through a Leviathan able to 
prohibit individual non-compliance threatening social harmony.  On the one hand the 
leviathan’s role is purely punitive in character (Hobbes 1996: 214).  When a subject 
violates the social covenant the leviathan is charged with punishing him or her in the 
name of collective security.  On the other hand Hobbes’s sovereign must act 
preventatively to avert potential risks to this social peace (Hobbes 1996: 124).  This 
flexible remit ranges from deciding matters of acceptable speech in the public sphere 
to the determination of labour laws (Hobbes 1996: 371, 125, 171).  Importantly, 
Hobbes does not specify the form that this Leviathan must take.  While favouring 
monarchy he accepts that democracy or aristocracy may be equally successful 
(Hobbes: 135).  Instead his principal concern is collective security and the avoidance 
of conflict.  At the heart of this system thus is the presence of fear obligating subjects 
to follow sovereign mandates despite their natural passions desiring short-term gain 
at the expense of their fellow citizen.  Hobbes argues therefore that:
The final cause, end or design of men (who naturally love Liberty and Dominion 
over others) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves (in which we 
see them live in commonwealths) is the foresight of their own preservation, and 
of a more contented life thereby; that is to say of getting them out of that 
miserable condition of War, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been 
shown) to the natural passions of men, when there is no visible power to keep 
them in awe, and tye them by fear of punishment to the performance of their 
covenants.  (Hobbes 1996: 117).            
Totalitarianism is essential for this purpose as it is only in the permitting of an almost 
unlimited sovereign authority that individuals will be constrained to follow the social 
contract.  The continual prospects of “war of all against all” demands a strong 
leviathan capable of ensuring order in the face of any and all emerging threats and 
possible subversions.  Further this “order” must be maintained through the continued 
existence of the commonwealth-therefore conflating the success of the state with the 
overall survival of its individual members, a survival that can only be ensured 
moreover through a totalitarian leader.  Notice further that for Hobbes totalitarianism 
doesn’t necessarily imply wholesale control only that the limits of sovereignty is at the 
discretion of the sovereign.  Individuals for their part are required to conform to this 
totalitarian system of rule to avoid a more bleak future of eternal discord.   Hobbes 
therefore constructs a vision of legitimate rule where individuals submit to domination 
for their very survival.  Thus in the world of Hobbes to be free is to be dominated, to 
be dominated is to be free.
Modern capitalism functions out of an analogous framework to that of 
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Hobbes, especially in terms of its desire for organizational obedience.  While modern 
capitalist discourses valorise individual initiative and enterprise, it like Hobbes asks 
the majority of individuals to surrender their natural liberty for the controlled 
environment of the workplace.  In a strikingly similar process the innate freedom of 
the capitalist subject is voluntarily forfeited for the security of a constricting market 
institution.  Moreover, this surrendering of liberty stems from the same rationale. 
Here the “free” individual, at liberty to do, go and live as he or she pleases leaves the 
competitive sphere of market competition and instead agrees to a more subservient 
position in a larger organization.  They do so to ensure their own material survival as 
well as the comfort of regularized pay and benefits.  Thus they forgo the short-term 
rationality of complete freedom for the “peace” of institutional conformity and 
consented servitude.  Put more concretely, individuals will choose not to own their 
own business; despite the independence it provides, in order to guarantee their 
continued material survival through the auspices of a larger company.
Moreover, as with Hobbes capitalist organizations desire formally a 
totalitarian system in which an employer decides what level of regulation is 
necessary in relationship to his or her employees.  It is up ultimately to management 
to choose how deeply it desires to control its staff.  Thus while one company may 
enforce a strict dress code while others may not, in the final instance the degree of 
conscription is decided solely by those in power.  In this way an organization is given 
free reign to control all aspects of an individual’s working life that they see fit. 
Institutions justify this totalitarianism through appeals to the overriding imperative of 
organizational survival.  If a company fails then so to does the security of its 
employees.  Thus the continued existence of the inscribing organization is translated 
and integrally connected to the existence of its subjects.  This totalitarian allowance 
in capitalism based on the need to preserve an organization for the very survival of 
its members echoes Hobbesian legitimization along the same line as a Leviathan is 
provided an almost infinite scope to determine what is necessary to sustain the 
commonwealth.  Hobbes therefore offers an early means for justifying totalitarian 
regimes, one currently in use within dominating capitalist organizations.
Saving the Individual to Save the State and Organization
Perhaps just as significant as their similar logics for totalitarianism are their almost 
parallel limitations both Hobbes and capitalism places on this largely unlimited 
sovereignty.  Each sets restrictions around the sanctity of the subject’s life.  If for 
17
Hobbes the purpose of the Leviathan is to prevent eternal conflict, preserving 
individual survival, allowing the sovereign to unlawfully and arbitrarily execute those 
they rule would be ultimately self-defeating.  Yet while ostensibly about the needs of 
the subject of greater importance for Hobbes is the resiliency of the state.  Without 
citizens there would be no commonwealth.  Further by privileging the state as the 
only means for ensuring individual and collective survival subjects can be expected 
to have a heightened desire to protect it against unrest.  On the other side of the 
spectrum, a Leviathan cannot be so repressive to ferment rebellion.  Of over riding 
importance thus was maintaining the state and its overall functioning.  Totalitarianism 
was simply a means for this end.  
Akin to Hobbes in contemporary capitalism employers cannot harm, and 
needless to say kill, its workforce.  Both mangers and workers are constrained by the 
needs of sustaining the company.  The entire point of capitalist regulation is 
consequentialist, centring on making the organization more profitable and 
economically viable.  As in the Hobbesian perspective, without workers there is not 
company.  Recognition of workplace diversity as well as more general trends 
concerning a greater sensitivity to employee’s emotional needs all revolve around the 
mandates of organizational survival.  In moreover linking institutional fortunes to 
those of its members in the most fundamental way possible, their very material 
subsistence, organizations are able to demand conformity for a “larger good.” 
Equally in Hobbes and capitalism subjects accept totalitarian practices due to the 
supposed need to maintain constricting systems, the state and market organizations 
respectively, and by proxy their own lives. 
  What is apparent therefore in Hobbes and capitalism at their most basic level 
is a similar legitimization for totalitarian inscription.  In both individuals begin in 
freedom and end up in submission.  In both subjects rationally choose to be 
dominated due to promises of security and survival.  Further, each justifies this 
totalitarianism in terms of the needs for over-arching stability.  Thus Hobbes and 
capitalism construct rationales for invasive and nearly all encompassing modes of 
control through appeals their necessity in ensuring individual survival.  Yet each also 
shares desires for individuals to not merely rationally embrace this reasoning but to 
internalize its values and freely consent to its rule.  As such both would face the 
same problems stemming from this wish to wholesale shape subjectivity and thus 
open the space for the positive employment of cynicism.
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Consent, Internalization and Dis-Identification in Hobbes and Capitalism
Central to the Hobbessian project is individual consent.  This need for consent is 
derived from the competing and contradictory elements contained within Hobbes’ 
theory-namely freedom and domination.  On first glance his argument is rife with 
tension over exactly how one can negotiate appeals to natural liberty and 
totalitarianism.  Indeed why would a free individual voluntarily agree to become a 
subordinate subject?  Hobbes’ first inclination is to provide a rational explanation for 
this transference of power.  The anarchy of freedom is transplanted by the stability of 
submission.  As inherently rational creatures humans are able realize this truth and 
act accordingly.  Therefore unlike natural orders of domination a Leviathan acquires 
his authority through the consensus of those he or she governs.  In his own words: 
The way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from 
the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to 
secure them in such sort, as that by their own industrie, and by the fruites of the 
Earth, thye may nouristh themselves and live contentedly, is to confere all their 
power and streinght upon Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce 
all their Will, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as to say, to 
appoint one man, or Assembley of men, to bear their Person; and everyone to 
owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth 
their Person, shall Act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concerned 
the Common Peace and Saftie, and therein to submit their wills, everyone to his 
Will, and their Judgements, to his Judgement. This is more than Consent, or 
Concord, it is a really unity of them all, in one and the same Person, made 
covenant of every man to every man….” (Hobbes 1996: 120).
What remains troubling in this formulation however is how Hobbes can rectify 
his dualistic vision of human motivation premised equally on reason and passion.  If 
his system of totalitarian inscription is so self-evident why has it not already been 
achieved and why has such authoritarian relationships of sovereignty continually 
been undermined?  Hobbes’ implicit solution is to emphasize his appeal to rationality-
to guide human action so that they understand the benefit and need for totalitarian 
regulation.  In the face of mounting unrest against monarchy and the appearance of 
civil war with the possibility for even greater discord in the future Hobbes sought to 
transform officially sanctioned hierarchical associations of rule into a freely given 
individual submission to authority.  Importantly, conservatives of his time rejected his 
theory as heresy on the grounds that he situates conformity not in any essentialized 
view of “divine right” but as made through considerations of utility.  The king is by no 
means pre-ordained nor any type of Leviathan figure for that matter.  Instead it is 
gained and maintained only through the realization of its beneficial character and the 
acceptance of its legitimacy by all members of the community equally.
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Thus at the heart of Hobbes is a desire for individuals to internalize the value 
of domination-phrasing it in terms of their own good as well as for the community at 
large.  The formal enshrinement of totalitarianism would itself be insufficient if 
individuals felt or saw no reason to abide by such a system.  One of Hobbes key 
innovations is to argue not merely for authoritarianism per say but for the 
identification of subjects to this authoritarian subordination.  To do so he frames this 
domination in terms of consent.  An individual chooses subordination out of his or her 
own free will, rationally and with full assent to the righteousness of this decision.  In 
doing so a subject is asked to identify completely with the commonwealth, to assume 
that he or she is this political community in full.  Any attempt thus to subvert the 
social contract would be for Hobbes an insult not to the leviathan but to one’s own 
self.
Yet while Hobbes primarily relies on reason for this determination he also 
recognizes the usefulness of ideology for this purpose.  In addition to making the 
case for the rational handing over of liberty for the security of being ruled he further 
compels people in positions of authority, such as teachers and fathers, to instruct 
those under them about the need for sovereign obedience (Hobbes: 234-236, 373-
374).  Further he asks that those learning these values accept them not blindly but 
“sincerely from the heart” ( 236). Hobbes thus provides a theory that at its 
foundations offers an objective and subjective strategy for achieving authoritarianism. 
As such it expresses its totalitarianism both externally in the formal rights of the 
sovereign to decide what is necessary to maintain peace and internally in its 
complete ideological inscription of the subject into its system of values.  Put 
differently, Hobbes wants a form of governance able to regulate a subject’s actions 
while subjectively determining her over-arching perspective as well.     
More to the point it creates a theoretical framework for normatively 
legitimizing structural problems of stratification and subordination.  Hobbes theory 
seeks to justify authoritarian rule and uneven relationships of power via discourses of 
freedom, consent, and security.  Further, his argument desires to implement a 
totalitarian system of sovereignty through completely transforming an individual’s 
perspective in line with this end.  It draws on the rational as well as the constructive 
possibility of ideological arguments to convince subjects of the moral correctness of 
their subjugation.  In this way Hobbes advocates a totalitarian means for achieving 
totalitarian ends.    
Like Hobbes capitalism similarly draws on ideas of consent to justify its own 
discursive practices of control.  Capitalist organizations normatively phrase their 
wholesale regulation over their workforce using the same ideas of freedom and 
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choice.  Accordingly, these institutions present contemporary situations of 
totalitarianism in emphasizing the supposed free choice of individuals in accepting 
such conscripting conditions.  Despite evidence questioning the voluntary nature of 
these exchanges (Preston 1984) analogous to Hobbes capitalism defends its 
totalitarianism through highlighting paradoxically its foundations in “freedom.” 
Consequently, it is largely able to legitimize its invasive and potentially all-
encompassing modes of control via its recourse to the supposed liberty underpinning 
these decisions.  More simply, since individuals choose out of their accord to enter 
into these organizations any complaint concerning its remit is said to be null and void. 
In employing this discourse capitalism desires thus to validate its reliance on systems 
of totalitarian oversight by subscribing them to the deliberate preference of the 
subjugated individuals themselves.  Further, it longs for these subjects to internalize 
such values as their own-justifying for themselves that this submission is rational and 
necessary.
In addition capitalism acts to inscribe individuals into totalitarian organizations 
through constructing subjectivities of unity and fraternity.  Parallel to Hobbesian 
notions of a civil religion institutional rhetoric of being as a family and “as one with the 
company” emotionally connects employees to these subordinating organizations.  It 
moreover reflects upon the dualistic character of totalitarianism in both capitalism and 
Hobbes.  As with Hobbes capitalism seeks not only to establish a totalitarian system 
of institutional rule but also to completely shape an individual’s subjectivities.  Its 
traditional political opposition to explicitly totalitarian forms of governance-namely that 
of Communism-demands that it couches its own authoritarianism through notions of 
freedom and shared community.  Implied thus in capitalist regulation is the need for 
proper ideological discourses able to convince subjects of the justness of 
organizational totalitarianism thus avoiding questions of moral legitimacy.
Yet the difficulty in such totalitarianism is exactly its totalised character.  It is 
impossible to ever fully inscribe an individual within a given subjectivity.  These 
ideological perspectives will always be incomplete and become available to 
challenge.  Regardless of whether one is referring to a political community or 
workplace-these social spaces will forever by crisscrossed by competing 
understandings and individualized desires.  To deal with this reality concerning 
totalitarianism’s innate futility both Hobbes and capitalism have positively 
transformed such possible dislocations into a manageable cynicism.  In separating 
the freedom one has in word and action they have constructed acceptable spaces of 
dissent that ultimately reinforce and strengthen existing hegemonic configurations.
Separating Words and Thoughts: Hobbes, Capitalism, and an Acceptable Cynicism
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The totalitarian desires contained within the early liberal writings of Hobbes and in 
modern capitalist organizations is inherently undermined by the impossibility of ever 
totally inscribing a subject within a single ideology.  In short the problem of totalitarian 
is the futility of totalitarianism.  The innately incomplete character of inscribing 
discourses naturally catalyzes hegemonic questioning.  Efforts at homogeneity thus 
create paradoxically a greater awareness of heterogeneity.  To say you are to be 
“this and only this” lead exactly to subjects saying, “no I am not.”  To confront these 
issues Hobbes and modern capitalism have relied upon cynicism to minimize the 
prospects for later movements of change.  By opening up the permanent space for 
dis-identification these theories ultimately create a framework whereby individuals 
may be comfortably compliant.  This involves dually the idea that one is performing a 
necessary unchanging role that they nonetheless disagree with and secondly the 
subsequent ethical distancing one has to these conscripting systems.  Put differently, 
subjects are permitted internal dissension due to the perceived immutable nature of 
these communities or organizations and their underlying ideologies.
Early in his work Hobbes distinguishes between words and actions in terms of 
importance.  It is only in and through the act that the word or verbal longing can be 
actualized and judged.  More importantly Hobbes mistrusts words.  Actions are solid 
and real where as words are fantasies or simple idealistic desires.  This perspective 
is clear in his discussions regarding the need for a leviathan in ensuring the social 
contract.  Words alone cannot guarantee the collective peace.  The possibility of 
tangible force is essential in this regard.  He states, “covenants without the sword, 
are but words, and are of no strength to secure a man at all” (Hobbes 1996: 120). 
Thus Hobbes reveals his overriding concern with performance as opposed to 
abstraction-the end result instead of idle longings and untrustworthy verbal 
covenants.  His emphasis therefore is on the construction of stability not its simple 
articulation.
This action oriented totalitarian perspective however becomes directly 
challenged when having to deal with competing levels of authority.  In Hobbes’ time 
the state was always subsidiary to the religious, at least theoretically.  Proposing a 
total politics as well as the essentiality of above all else an active sovereign obligation 
contradicted the overriding authority of the divine.  It raised significant questions for 
individuals regarding whom they owed their allegiance-God or the leviathan. 
Specifically problematic is to what extent religion should primarily be a force for social 
stability or a personal means for salvation.  If the sovereign is the highest leader, the 
new guarantee for human survival, can they compel subject to accept eternal 
damnation for the sake of secular peace?  If the leviathan demands that all citizens 
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follow Catholicism or Sciencetology, whether by mistake or otherwise, while 
Calvinism is the one true religion how is an individual to respond?  To disobey the 
leader would be to fail themselves and their fellow humans in fermenting instability 
and possible war.  To go against God further would lead to a more long-term problem 
of hell.
Hobbes deals with this contradiction through implicitly promoting practices of 
cynical conformity.  First as perhaps expected, Hobbes offers a rational solution. 
God in giving humans reason to realize the necessity of the Leviathan expects 
individual to follow the sovereign’s will (Hobbes 1996: 199).  Yet this answer does 
little to address concerns over God’s final judgement.  It is here that Hobbes 
introduces the positive possibility of cynicism.  Drawing on his earlier distinction 
between words and actions he posits that ones thoughts are not really reflected in 
one’s actions.  Only actions belong to sovereignty.  By contrast what one internally 
believes is always free due to its inherent inconsequential nature.  Hobbes argues in 
this sense that a Sovereign 
…cannot oblige men to believe; though as a Civil Soveraign he may make 
Laws suitable to his doctorine, which my oblige men to certain actions, and 
sometimes to such as they would not otherwise do, and which he ought not to 
command, and yet when they are commanded, the are Laws; and the external 
actions done in obedience to them, without the inward approbation, are the 
actions of the Soveraign, and not of the Subject, which is in that case but as an 
instrument, without any motion of his own at all, because God hath commanded 
to obey them all” (Hobbes 1996: 389).
Thus if one believes in the correct God they are not made religiously responsible for 
the decisions of the leviathan.  The divine will not punish them for obeying the 
sovereign as along as they were internally faithful to the true ways of God as “God 
accepteth not the Will for the Deed, but only in the Faithful” (Hobbes 1996: 413).  For 
this reason in Hobbes view “Faith and Obedience are both Necessary to Salvation” 
(Hobbes 1996: 413).
This separation of word and action also materializes similarly regarding sin 
and acceptable dissent.  According to Hobbes to think of misconduct is not in and of 
itself a sin.  To dream of murdering doesn’t make one a murderer or any wrongdoing 
for that matter.  He states:
To be delighted in the Imagination only, of being possessed of another man's 
goods, servants, or wife, without any intention to take them by force, or fraud, is 
no breach of the Law, that sayeth thou shall not covet, nor is the pleasure a 
man may have in imagining, or dreaming of the death of him…For to be 
pleased in the faction of that , which would please a man if it were recall, is a 
Passion so adherent to the Nature both of man, and every other living creature, 
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as to make it a Sinne, were to make Sinne out of being a Man” (Hobbes 1996: 
201).
Hobbes further transposes this religious perspective onto his politics. To think 
disobedience is as harmless and non-punishable as to dream of murder. It is only the 
action of subversion that is of any concern.  Even the sin of positive intention is 
cannot be prosecuted within the commonwealth as:
Crime is a sin, but not every sin is a Crime. To intend to steal, or kill, is a sinne, 
though it never appears in Word, or Fact: for God that seeth the thoughts of 
man can lay it to his charge; but till it appear something done, or said, by which 
the intention bay be argued by a human judge, it hath not the name of a crime” 
(Hobbes 1996: 201).
Hobbes thus positively distinguishes between thought and action in order to ensure 
conformity.  In privileging the external over the internal he hopes to relegate dissent 
purely within the realm of thought and therefore inaction.
Yet this dichotomy should not be understood as the making mutually 
exclusive thought and action. Instead Hobbes presents a conception of the subject 
that ably combines these two elements for inducing a subject’s overall obedience.  In 
pre-supposing thought as a space of unalienable freedom he sets the boundaries for 
acceptable antagonisms.  While an individual may never be completely interpellated 
in a sovereign ideology they nonetheless can be taught what the limits of such 
disillusionment are.  In this sense the Althusserian notion of externality concerning 
ideology depends often exactly on an “internal” dis-identification. To demand external 
compliance requires the perceived presence of internal liberty.
Capitalist organizations base their own regulatory practices around this 
separation of thought and action, expressed in their positive allowance for cynicism. 
Company’s even while desiring complete control over their employee’s subjectivity 
ask no more than for its workers to follow its rules and actively dissent.  The positive 
employment of cynicism by these institutions as suggested by Fleming and Spicer 
becomes clearer when viewed through its Hobbesian forerunner. The situating of 
thoughts as the ultimate site of freedom leaves action almost entirely under the 
command of the sovereign.  Subjects become satisfied exactly in being dissatisfied-in 
so much as they view their liberty in terms of internality and not external effect. The 
internal or secretly shared complaint becomes the modus opperandi for 
considerations of resistance more generally. Capitalism like Hobbes thus has 
symbolically set aside the sphere of thought as the proper place for dissent while 
demanding full and total conformity in action. In acting out the subjective freedom of 
the cynic the individual is therefore often embracing the confining politics of 
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sovereign obedience.
Cynicism, Responsibility, and Dis-Identification 
A key component of Hobbesian cynicism is its displacement of social responsibility 
by individuals through processes of dis-identification.  If one subjectively distances 
themselves from leadership and its decisions this subsequently causes a rejection of 
responsibility for these actors’ actions.  Hobbes problem of religion reflects this 
phenomenon.  By not making the subject divinely accountable for the Leviathan’s 
choice of public religion he frees them from all sense of community responsibility in 
terms of its decisions and direction.  Instead their only ethical obligation resides in 
conformity to sovereign prerogatives for its continued survival.
The effect of this ethical erosion is the lessening of desires for more 
transformitory change. Why should an individual try to challenge the religious 
convictions set out by the Leviathan if internally they are free to believe as they wish? 
Their only secular responsibility is obedience. They can think, feel, and believe what 
they want and receive no punishment from the Leviathan or in turn God for the 
sovereign’s potential wrongdoing. Thus the subjects’ liberty of thought is the 
existential freedom of the non-decision. “I was just following orders” becomes a 
justification for the internally but actively unethical consenting subject.  Consequently, 
the freedom of subjectivity is two-fold: the liberty of internal thought and the freedom 
of complete irresponsibility for one’s surrounding and society.   
Cynicism plays heavily into this jettisoning of ethical responsibility. The cynic 
is not merely disillusioned with their superiors but with themselves as well. In 
particular cynicism is premised on the subject’s supposed inability for enacting 
change.  It thus takes away obligations for seeking reform or revolution to these 
systems.  If it is futile then why bother?  Moreover, this dis-identification gradually 
separates individuals morally from their actions.  Through situating thought as the 
locus of freedom and dissent feelings of responsibility over one’s conduct becomes 
reduced and in many cases completely disappear. By partaking in cynicism thus one 
is to a large degree comfortably rejecting their own responsibility for their action and 
those within their community.
Capitalism similarly employs cynicism to distance individuals from feelings of 
ethical responsibility to their environment. In allowing for, and at points promoting, 
this dis-identification they make it easier for individuals to deal with their perhaps 
unethical unease over their company’s practices and overall ideology. The theme of 
“what can I do I just work here” permits employees to simultaneously recognize the 
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immorality of their organization while comfortably rejecting or feeling any obligation to 
change them. The structural barriers preventing workers from enacting such a 
transformation serves to further isolate individuals from feelings of ethical 
accountability.  If an employee is barred from real democratic decision making 
concerning institutional direction then what plausible justification does he or she have 
for questioning its larger prerogatives? Considering that legally most employees are 
not liable for the overall conduct of their workplace further exacerbates this problem. 
How can one hold a lowly Enron sales representative at blame for the corrupt actions 
of Ken Lay? The dis-identification resulting from the lack of genuine democracy in 
capitalist organizations thus directly bears upon the daily cynicism of its members. 
Moreover, it speaks to how a personally ethical individual can comfortably stop 
themselves from challenging market institutions even when subjectively realizing 
their unethical character.
Order, Dis-Identification, and the Construction of the Cynical Totalitarian 
Subject
The preceding examination of Hobbes and capitalism permits a broader reading of 
the interrelationship between totalitarianism and cynicism for ideological 
interpellation.  Hegemonic discourses deal with their innately incomplete nature by 
presenting their specific dominant understandings as related to the maintenance of 
social order more generally while allowing an internal but ultimately ineffectual space 
for internal dissent to these revealing fields of meaning.  In short dominant ideologies 
use their totalistic nature to render subjects less capable of large-scale questioning 
through fear of anarchy and in the final analysis non-survival.  This strategy is 
complemented through promoting perspectives of individual cynicism, which 
accommodate subjective dis-identification, but nonetheless demands external 
compliance.  Through interrogating how these seemingly contradictory phenomena of 
totalitarianism and cynicism work together it becomes to clear more generally how 
necessarily incomplete ideologies maintain their overall hegemonic status.
Importantly both Hobbes and capitalism equate conformity to totalitarian 
systems with individual survival.  Hobbes posits the keeping of the social contract via 
obedience to the sovereign as a pre-requisite for ensuring a subject’s very continued 
worldly existence. Without such compliance society would revert back to eternal 
warfare and make tenuous an individual's survival.  He thus justified the surrendering 
of natural freedom for the security of the leviathan and conformity.  Similarly capitalist 
organizations legitimize the complete submission to their regulation as necessary for 
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individuals to maintain their material reproduction.  Without these institutions people 
would be unable to draw a salary, buy a house, or even purchase food.  As with 
Hobbes’ social covenant individuals agree to both acquiescence their liberty and put 
aside differences with co-workers for the security of obedience.    
By situating ideological compliance with subsistence Hobbes and capitalism 
effectively conflate such conformity to the achievement of order in toto. 
Totalitarianism exists in this instance not merely through regimes of complete control 
or even wholesale ideological inscription but as the only means for ensuring survival. 
Its totalistic character in this sense is exactly in its presenting of itself as the sole 
course for guaranteeing one’s life.  Obviously one is free to reject Hobbes’ social 
contract or a capitalist job but in doing so he or she is exposed to a world of complete 
competition and a precarious self-sufficiency.  Consequently, it becomes difficult for 
individuals to imagine their existence outside of this ideological horizon and easier to 
simply submit to its conscripting mandates.  These systems thus base their success 
on equating their specific dominant articulations with the existence of the Law 
completely.  They present themselves not simply as one amongst competing social 
orders but as the presence of social order wholesale.  No wonder Žižek, even while 
arguing for a renewed class struggle, declares, “today one cannot even imagine a 
viable alternative to global capitalism” (Žižek 2000: 321).  Indeed for individuals to 
rebel against these systems would be to support anarchy and potentially precipitate 
their own ruin.
This linking of totalitarianism with survival further presents obedience to the 
Law with the subsequent fulfilment of individual fantasy.  Considering that the 
hegemonic orders proposed by Hobbes and modern capitalist organizations implies 
fundamentally an individual's sustained material existence they also herald 
themselves as the necessary condition for achieving their subsequent social 
aspirations.  For Hobbes underlying all individual success was the foundations 
provided by the assured peace of the social contract.  His Leviathan offered not only 
the bare minimum of guaranteed survival but the ability to securely gaining individual 
desires in an orderly and safe environment:
The office of the Soveraign (be it Monarch or an Assembly) consisteth in the 
end, for which he was trusted with the Soveraign Power, namely the 
procuration of the safety of the people; to which his obliged by the Law of 
Natuare and to render an account thereof to God, tha Author of the Law, and to 
none but him.  But by Safety here is not meant a bare Preservation, but also all 
other Contements of live, which every man by lawfull Industry, without danger, 
or hurt to the Common-wealth, shall acquire to himselfe” (Hobbes 1996: 231).
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Capitalism operates out of the same framework.  It presents itself as the most viable 
means for continued existence and in doing so as the principle means for attaining 
what one wants out of society.  This basis for phantasmatic fullness works dually for 
those pursuing wholeness inside or outside their place of work.  In terms of the 
former capitalist organizations serve as sites for realizing all one’s interpersonal 
goals.  As to the later it provides the means for accomplishing one’s extra-curricular 
objectives such as family and friends.
However, the over-arching nature of these ideologies, especially when 
representative of the Law, leads to the questioning of these regimes as to their ability 
for providing as much as they claim. If these discourses are the locus for achieving 
wholeness how does one deal with their inevitable failure in this regard?  It is here 
that cynicism plays such a productive role for interpellation. By making available 
internal dissent to individual subjects these prevailing ideologies are able to sustain 
their dominance while limitedly permitting dis-identification to their rule. This feeds 
into the conflation of specific hegemonic articulations and the maintenance of social 
order more generally.  In situating a given governing configuration as representative 
of the Law overall they sanction an acceptable cynicism to their prerogatives while 
reinforcing their position as the only possible means for ensuring continued individual 
survival. In this way subjects can legitimately express sentiments of futility while 
acting compliantly.  It is akin to saying “I don’t like my present situation, but what else 
is there?  What can I do but accept it and hope for the best.”  Cynicism thus acts as a 
salve for feelings of disappointment to a system that is seemingly permanent and 
necessary.
Conclusion: Reinforcing Totalitarianism through Cynicism
In this paper I have tried to show the symbiotic relationship between discursive 
systems of totalitarianism and cynicism.  Whether speaking of a social Leviathan a la 
Hobbes or localized capitalist regulation each relies upon the symbiotic combination 
of total governance with the positive allowance for individual dis-identification.  The 
inherent failures of totalitarian discourses to fully interpellate a subject requires a 
subjective freedom of thought expressed via an ineffectual cynicism, a point borne 
witness to in the theoretical work of Žižek.  Individuals are thus, either implicitly or 
explicitly, encouraged to manifest their discontent through a non-active liberty in 
thought or an “ideology of cynicism” (Žižek: 1989).  By providing the space to think 
resistance these systems are able to legitimately demand and make easier 
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obedience in action. Thus the liberating effect of cynical rebellion is the foundation for 
an acting compliance.
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